The No Barber Principle: Towards Formalised Selection in the Inaccessible Game
Abstract
The inaccessible game is an information-theoretic dynamical system governed by three information loss axioms, a marginal entropy conservation constraint and maximum entropy dynamics. In this paper we look at selection in the game. Our aim is to develop a selection policy for the game rules based on a minimal set of assumptions. We seek necessary consistency constraints for self-determining dynamical systems. Specifically, we suggest that rules that quantify over distinctions they cannot internally represent risk impredicative-style circularity. Our criterion is motivated by an analogy with Russell’s paradox. We formulate a no-barber principle which prohibits dynamics that appeal to external adjudicators or structure lying outside the system. Through the no-barber principle we argue that the classical category FinProb is structurally incompatible with the no-copying instantiation studied here, while the noncommutative category NCFinProb, in which von Neumann entropy is characterised, is a more natural candidate for the game’s internal language.